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Abstract
Functional languages with strong static type systems have
beneficial properties to help ensure program correctness and
reliability. Surprisingly, their practical significance in appli-
cations is low relative to other languages lacking in those
dimensions. In this paper, the programs-as-proofs analogy
is taken seriously to gain speculative insights by analysis of
creation habits in the proof-centric discipline of mathemat-
ics. Viewed in light of this analogy, a sampling of mathe-
maticians’ attitudes towards formal proof suggests that the
crucial role of intuition and experimentation in programming
tasks may be under appreciated, hinting at a possible ex-
planation of the challenges rigorously disciplined languages
face in practical applications.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3 [Programming
Languages]; K.2 [History of Computing]: Software
Keywords language ergonomics, type systems, program-
ming systems, programs as proofs, propositions as types
1. Introduction
The thoughts in this paper grew over the course of a year,
out of the opening remarks of my thesis defense in logic,
as well as a series of informal discussions I have had since
starting an industry job as a software developer. While I am
in no way sure that what I am saying is authoritative or true,
it has been my impression that my line of thought has been
thought-provoking for those on the receiving end, and it is in
this spirit that I decided to elaborate my thoughts into a form
that might potentially reach a wider audience.
Being a student of logic with a professional and practical
interest in computer programming, I was looking to write my
thesis in an area that would gainfully combine both topics
(Emerich 2015). The topic of type systems for programming
languages was an obvious fit, but I soon faced with a puzzle:
As a student of logic, everything about sound static type sys-
tems seemed obviously right, beautiful and true, and the re-
search papers and languages I worked through made perfect
sense. On the other hand, from my professional work in soft-
ware development, I knew how little attention industry paid
to the rightness, beauty and truth of this approach to pro-
gramming. My puzzlement is certainly shared in large parts
of the programming language theory community: If “types
are the leaven of computer programming; they make it di-
gestible” (Milner), they are light-weight formal methods that
automatically prove “the absence of certain program behav-
iors” (Pierce) (both Pierce 2002), and we all want to write
correct programs, why would anyone not use them? And es-
pecially, why would big, for-profit companies opt to not use
them, or use such perversions of type systems as to render
any guarantees worthless?
Industry practitioners seldom explain their motives but
simply vote with their feet, or if they do explain, they ex-
plain in terms incomprehensible to PL researchers. It is not
surprising then that the disregard for advanced type systems
is often explained away by stupidity, carelessness, or lack of
proper education. Without even wanting to dispute these la-
bels, I started to wonder whom programming languages are
created for. If a technological artifact is inadequate for its in-
tended target audience and therefore its intended use case, it
is unacceptable to blame the recipients of the artifact.
To illustrate, let us look at another discipline where tech-
nological artifacts are designed for a large audience, and
which is often invoked in certain parts of the software en-
gineering community: architecture.
In the wake of World War II, war-time destruction and
the rapid growth of metropolitan areas necessitated the rapid
provision of affordable housing. In countries all around the
world, a solution was seen in modernist living machines.
High-rise buildings for a new kind of communal living were
built with great enthusiasm, and abandoned with great dis-
appointment as many of the projects became attractors of
poverty and living conditions rapidly deteriorated. New con-
cepts for urban development with dense housing have incor-
porated feedback from this failing to create less fragile living
environments for human beings. Another example of well-
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intended but ultimately failed architecture is Haus Wittgen-
stein in Vienna, a modernist building designed in part by
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Few of his family mem-
bers succeeded to live in this house for long, even while re-
marking on its beauty and elegance.
Would we find it convincing if the architects of mod-
ernist high-rise projects or Haus Wittgenstein blamed their
dwellers for their inability to dwell in them? If they de-
clared them too uneducated to live properly? I think not.
Why then should we let programming language researchers
off the hook, if their artifacts fail to meet the needs of the
programming community?
What is to be done to learn about the needs of humans
when constructing programs? Ultimately, this is an empirical
question, requiring research and approximation by trial and
error. To guide both processes, it is prudent to start with
some judicious guessing. This speculative text is an attempt
to judiciously guess plausible hypotheses from an analysis
of 20th century mathematics.
Section 2 introduces a formal connection between math-
ematics and computer programming, and questions the im-
plied role of formal proof in mathematical practice. Sec-
tion 3 stops at several points of historical significance in
the past hundred or so years in mathematics, summarizing
discussions about the interplay of intuition, formalism and
rigor. Section 4 looks back at recurring themes found in said
discussions, takes the programs-as-proofs analogy seriously,
and defines some criteria to evaluate programming systems
by. In section 5 these criteria are applied to a small number
of recent proposals for programming languages and systems.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Programming in the Image of
Mathematics
Modern day research in type systems for programming lan-
guages occurs in fruitful collaboration with research in type
theory and mathematical logic. Languages like Haskell and
OCaml are part of the lineage of ML, a language grown out
of a system for theorem proving. GHC, the Glasgow Haskell
Compiler, supports a variety of extensions to Haskell’s type
system, that bring it closer to the powerful dependent type
systems found in proof assistants like Coq and Agda. The
connection between programming languages and mathemat-
ical logic is described succinctly in Per Martin-Lo¨f’s influen-
tial Constructive Mathematics and Computer Programming
(Martin-Lo¨f 1985):
Parallel to the development from low to high level
programming languages, there has been a change in
one’s understanding of the programming activity it-
self. It used to be looked (down) upon as the rather
messy job of instructing this or that physically exist-
ing machine, by cunning tricks, to perform computa-
tional tasks widely surpassing our own physical pow-
ers, something that might appeal to people with a lik-
ing for crossword puzzles or chess problems. But it
has grown into the discipline of designing programs
for various computational tasks, programs that have
to be written in a formally precise notation so as to
admit of automatic execution. [. . . ] It has made pro-
gramming an activity akin in rigour and beauty to that
of proving mathematical theorems. (This analogy is
actually exact in a sense which will become clear be-
low.)
The way in which the analogy is “actually exact” is by
means of a Curry-Howard-style correspondence between a
fictitious programming language (borrowing from ALGOL,
PASCAL and LISP) and Martin-Lo¨f’s theory of types. What
this correspondence really shows exactly is that in an ade-
quate language, the activity of writing programs is equiva-
lent to the activity of writing a formal proof1.
It is of course the unfamiliarity of the computer scientist
or logician with actual mathematical practice that allows
them to conclude that this is, without qualification, a good
thing. If, however, we look at the history of mathematics in
the last hundred or so years, we see that even in mathematics
the role of formal proof is contested or at least much more
complicated than commonly assumed.
The monograph The Mathematical Experience stems
from 1981, close to Martin-Lo¨f’s 1985 paper. Therein, Hersh
and Davis describe “the most mathematician-like mathe-
matician”2 to display “the discrepancy between the actual
work and activity” and even “his own perception of his work
and activity” (Davis and Hersh 1981, p. 34ff.). I will quote
selectively, though at some length, to illustrate:
He rests his faith on rigorous proof; he believes that
the difference between a correct proof and an incor-
rect one is an unmistakable and decisive difference.
[. . . ] Yet he is able to give no coherent explanation of
what is meant by rigor, or what is required to make
a proof rigorous. In his own work, the line between
complete and incomplete proof is always somewhat
fuzzy, and often controversial.
[. . . ]
To his fellow experts, he communicates [his] results
in a casual shorthand. “If you apply a tangential mol-
lifier to the left quasi-martingale, you can get an esti-
mate better than quadratic, so the convergence in the
Bergstein theorem turns out to be of the same order
as the degree of approximation in the Steinberg theo-
rem.” This breezy style is not to be found in his pub-
lished writings. There he piles up formalism on top of
formalism. Three pages of definitions are followed by
seven lemmas, and, finally, a theorem whose hypothe-
1 For a modern introduction and brief history, see (Wadler 2015).
2 As was customary at the time, this most mathematician-like mathemati-
cian is styled as “he”.
ses take half a page to state, while its proof reduces es-
sentially to “Apply Lemmas 1–7 to definitions A–H.”
When asked for a definition of proof, he gives one as
“cleared up by the logician Tarski [. . . ] and some others,
maybe Russell or Peano”, but also says that “of course no
one ever really does it. It would take forever!” The less one
knows about formal languages and formal logic, the better,
as “[that] stuff is all abstract nonsense anyway”.
Now, would our ideal mathematician be happy to do his
work in Martin-Lo¨f’s formal theory of types? One should
think not. Then why are we surprised if the average pro-
grammer does not seem to take to an equivalent program-
ming system?
We will, in the following, undertake a brief historical tour
of mathematics to find some clues as to why mathematical
practice does not conform to the ideal of formal proof.
3. Intuition and Formal Proof in
Mathematics
We begin our analysis, abruptly, early in the 20th century,
with the foundational crisis in mathematics in full swing.
In response to misunderstandings and embarrassing failures
in the face of an ever more significant mathematics, mathe-
maticians, logicians and philosophers tried to establish foun-
dations that would confirm and guarantee their understand-
ing of mathematics as the house of certainty. To restore the
endangered reputation of mathematics as a prototype of the
most rigid science, the goal had to be not only to axiom-
atize all of mathematics, but also to show that in the cho-
sen axiomatization contradictions are in general impossible
(Hilbert 1917, p. 411). Even Russell’s generous endeavor
of axiomatizing all of logic was not sufficient according to
Hilbert, as it was still necessary to establish that every math-
ematical problem has a solution (no ignorabimus), that every
solution can be verified, and to find a measure for the sim-
plicity of a proof. To put this plan into action, mathematical
concepts and practices such as propositions and proofs had
to be reified into mathematical objects that could be studied
with mathematical methods. The famous rigor of mathemat-
ics was to be applied to mathematics itself. The successes
and failures of Hilbert’s program are famous, but its recep-
tion was mixed from the onset.
3.1 Poincare´ on Intuition and Logic
Of interest for our analysis is the stance of Henri Poincare´,
who was at once appreciative of the quest for certainty and
skeptical of the emphasis on formalism. In a 1900 essay,
Poincare´ identifies “two entirely different kinds of minds”
among great mathematicians, “one sort are above all preoc-
cupied with logic”, advancing “step by step, after the manner
of a Vauban who pushes on his trenches against the place be-
sieged, leaving nothing to chance”, and the other are “guided
by intuition and at the first stroke make quick but sometimes
precarious conquests” (Poincare´ 2005, p. 1012). Poincare
believed it was the “very nature of their mind which makes
them logicians or intuitionalists”, and while “[the] first are
incapable of ‘seeing in space’, the others are quickly tired
of long calculations and become perplexed”. But both are
“equally necessary for the progress of science”, both “have
achieved great things that others could not have done”.
Poincare´ however was not blind to the progressive shift
towards formality and rigor, even among the “intuitional-
ists”, as “their readers have required of them greater con-
cessions”. The reason for this shift is the recognition that
intuition “cannot give us rigour, nor even certainty”. This is
why formalism and logical analysis are necessary to further
progress, a kind of cleaning up and clarifying that prevents
illicit jumping to conclusions. But “intuition must retain its
role as complement, [...] or as antidote to logic”, not just for
the student but also the creative scientist. To see the unity in
a mathematical problem, we need “a faculty which makes us
see the end from afar, and intuition is this faculty” (p. 1018).
Poincare´ uses the example of the concept of a continuous
function, which from the image of a continuous mark of
chalk gradually turned into a construction “irreproachable
in the eyes of the logician”. But even the logician relies on
some sort of intuition, only, as in the case of Hermite, “the
most abstract entities were for him like living beings”, allow-
ing them to “perceive at a glance the general plan of a logical
edifice”. “In rejecting the aid of the imagination, which, as
we have seen, is not always infallible, they can advance with-
out fear of deceiving themselves. Happy, therefore, are those
who can do without this aid! We must admire them; but how
rare they are!”
Poincare´, it seems, was not among them. His thesis ad-
viser characterized him as follows: “It must be said, if one
wants to give an accurate idea of how Poincare´ worked, that
many points of [his thesis] needed correction or explication.
Poincare´ was an intuitif ” (cited after Mclarty 1997). Mclarty
states that many of Poincare´’s publications offered crucial
new insights, laying the foundations to whole fields, all
while employing hasty (or no) proofs, and getting substan-
tial details wrong that were later to be worked out by others.
Poincare´’s question, “Who would venture to say whether he
preferred that Weierstrass had never written or that there had
never been a Riemann?”, should be restated for the reader:
“Who would wish that there had never been a Poincare´?”
3.2 New Math: Real Mathematics Comes to Schools
The foundational crisis in the past, and its shocking reve-
lations absorbed or ignored, parts of the formalists’ results
and spirit found their way into research mathematics. Proba-
bly the prototypical example of 20th-century formalist math-
ematics is the highly influential work of Nicolas Bourbaki,
a group of predominantly French mathematicians. Accord-
ing to a member, Bourbaki was set up almost in opposi-
tion to the intuitif Poincare´, against the older generation that
“had learned mathematics in the old-fashioned way”, “it was
not the fashion to value Poincare´ at all” (Senechal 1998).
In the 1960s, this spirit of renewal found its way into pri-
mary education in mathematics. Today still known (and of-
ten ridiculed) under the moniker “new math”, various educa-
tional reform programs in the United States and Europe put
set theory, Boolean algebra and further abstract nonsense on
schools’ curricula. A cautionary tale of educational reform
implemented in haste and abandoned without much analysis
or care, new math disappeared as quickly as it had been put
on the agenda, as teachers felt unable to teach and parents
unable to understand the new materials. The history of the
new math is complex and frequently misconstrued (Phillips
2015, p. 145), but the reactions of contemporary mathemati-
cians to its introduction provide interesting insight into their
attitudes. Especially in the United States, the reform efforts
led to controversies among professional mathematicians and
scientists, triggered not by the new emphasis on and interest
in mathematics education, but by the image of mathemat-
ics thought to be underlying the reform proposals (Phillips
2014).
Physicist Richard Feynman in a commentary on new
math stresses the importance of freedom, experimentation
and intuition in learning and practicing mathematics (Feyn-
man 1965). While this spirit “does not appear in [a math-
ematician’s] final proofs, which are simply demonstrations
or complete logical arguments which prove that a certain
conclusion is correct”, it is present in the way that he works
in “in order to obtain a guess as to what it is he is going to
prove before he proves it”. To give authority to his claim, he
quotes a pure mathematician, J.B. Roberts:
The scheme in mathematical thinking is to divine and
demonstrate. There are no set patterns of procedure.
We try this and that. We guess. We try to generalize
the result in order to make the proof easier. We try
special cases to see if any insight can be gained in this
way. Finally – who knows how? – a proof is obtained.
Mathematician and educator Morris Kline spent consid-
erable effort arguing against the new curriculum, publish-
ing both an essay, Logic Versus Pedagogy (Kline 1970), and
a book, Why Johnny Can’t Add (Kline 1974). His protest
against the reform was motivated by a strong belief in the
importance of intuition and gradual development in mathe-
matical training and practice. The arguments in both texts
make much use of historical developments and anecdotes,
illustrating the imperfections and intuitive leaps present in
the work of accomplished mathematicians. Kline presents as
an example the development of calculus from the basic con-
cept of “instantaneous rate of change of a function” (Kline
1970, p. 267) to the modern formally precise expression. He
documents the vague and faulty conceptualization evident in
the writings of Newton and Leibniz, and Newton’s defense
of his work against “overprecise critics” posing a threat to
the “fruits of invention”. The same aspect is highlighted in
Cauchy’s use of differentiability where he had only assumed
continuity, making, on the whole, substantial progress.
Like Feynman, Kline sees mathematics as “primarily a
creative activity, and this calls for imagination, geometric in-
tuition, experimentation, judicious guessing, trial and error,
the use of analogies of the vaguest sort, blundering and fum-
bling” (p. 271). To counter the response that intuition plays
this important role only in those new to a subject matter,
Kline recounts the anecdote of “the professor who was pre-
senting a logical proof to his class, got stuck in the course of
the proof, went over to the corner of the blackboard where he
drew some pictures, erased the pictures, and then continued
the proof” (p. 280).
In the end Kline concedes, quoting Weyl, that “logic is
the hygiene which the mathematician practices to keep his
ideas healthy and strong”.
3.3 The Threat of Speculative Mathematics
Our third episode is set in 1993–1994, a discussion held
in the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society and
triggered by a call for action by Arthur Jaffe and Frank
Quinn (Jaffe and Quinn 1993). The authors worried about
a perceived trend of an increase in speculative mathemat-
ics, due in part to a cultural clash between mathematics
and physics. A nearly categorical statement opens the paper:
“Modern mathematics is nearly characterized by the use of
rigorous proofs”. This is qualified to say that “information
about mathematical structures is achieved in two stages”,
in the first stage “intuitive insights are developed, conjec-
tures are made, and speculative outlines of justifications are
suggested”, in the second “the conjectures and speculations
are corrected; they are made reliable by proving them”. The
two-stage process is compared to physics, divided in theoret-
ical and experimental physics. For Jaffe and Quinn, theoret-
ical physics is analogous to the speculative, intuitive stage
in mathematical discovery, while experimental physics is
analogous to verification and proof of speculation. Where
in physics there has been productive division of labor along
those lines, Jaffe and Quinn decry what they see as an on-
slaught of speculative mathematics (which they call theoret-
ical mathematics), arguing that the culture of mathematics
is unprepared. A list of cautionary tales of speculative math-
ematics gone wrong is followed by a problem characteriza-
tion: Speculative work easily goes astray for lack of correc-
tions from rigorous proof, it hinders further work by causing
confusion about which parts are reliable, it gives glory to the
theorizers while leaving ungrateful cleanup work for others,
and finally confuses newcomers. They end with a short list of
prescriptions to amend the situation, mostly calling for ex-
plicit labeling of speculative work, and thus shifting culture
to reserve some glory for the task of rigorous validation.
This call was answered in a later issue of the bulletin
(Atiyah et al. 1994), in good numbers by some of the spec-
ulative perpetrators Jaffe and Quinn had reprimanded. I can
only recommend reading the responses, as they provide a
fascinating insight into the varieties of approaches and self-
images among researchers in mathematics. The reader fol-
lowing this advice will notice that my quotations in the fol-
lowing are highly selective, which should not be reason for
concern, considering that my claim is not that every mathe-
matician looks at intuition and formal proof in the way sug-
gested, but only that at least some amount of accomplished
mathematicians do.
We find the first commentator, Michael Atiyah, “agreeing
with much of the detail”, but rebelling “against their general
tone and attitude”, presenting “a sanitized view of mathe-
matics which condemns the subject to an arthritic old age”
(p. 178). “But if mathematics is to rejuvenate itself and break
exciting new ground it will have to allow for the exploration
of new ideas and techniques which, in their creative phase,
are likely to be as dubious as in some of the great eras of
the past. Perhaps we now have high standards of proof to
aim at but, in the early stages of new developments, we must
be prepared to act in more buccaneering style”. Providing an
example, “Hodge’s own proof was essentially faulty because
his understanding of the necessary analysis was inadequate.
Correct proofs were subsequently provided by better ana-
lysts, but this did not detract from Hodge’s glory”.
In a scathing comment, Armand Borel refers to the pe-
riodic waves of innovation and rigorization/systematization
that have been a permanent feature of mathematics, accom-
panied constantly by fears that one might overpower the
other. “Of course, [...] no part of mathematics can flourish
in a lasting way without solid foundations and proofs”.
Benoit Mandelbrot finds “most of it appalling”. For him,
Jaffe and Quinn’s proposal is reminiscent of the shunning
of great intuitive mathematicians such as Le´vy and Poincare´
by the mathematical establishment. He even goes so far as
to ask why there had been so few great intuitive researchers
of recent, and speaks of a “flow of young people” who were
“acknowledged as brilliant and highly promising; but they
could not stomach the Bourbaki credo” and left mathemat-
ics.
Saunders Mac Lane responds with an anecdote about a
discussion between Atiyah and himself, “about how mathe-
matical research is done”.
For Mac Lane it meant getting and understanding the
needed definitions, working with them to see what
could be calculated and what might be true, to finally
come up with new “structure” theorems. For Atiyah, it
meant thinking hard about a somewhat vague and un-
certain situation, trying to guess what might be found
out, and only then finally reaching definitions and the
definitive theorems and proofs. This story indicates
that the ways of doing mathematics can vary sharply,
as in this case between the fields of algebra and geom-
etry, while at the end there was full agreement on the
final goal: theorems with proofs. Thus differently ori-
ented mathematicians have sharply different ways of
thought, but also common standards as to the result.
If only the same could be said about differently oriented pro-
grammers! (Mac Lane goes on to say: “The sequence of the
understanding of mathematics may be: intuition, trial, error,
speculation, conjecture, proof. The mixture and the sequence
of these events differ widely in different domains, but there is
general agreement that the end product is rigorous proof—
which we know and can recognize, without the formal ad-
vice of the logicians.”)
We see a wide spectrum of opinions on the role of rig-
orous proof in professional mathematics. On one end, Mac
Lane voices a clear stance against ungrounded speculation
and a demand for proof as the golden standard, but paired
with a laissez-faire attitude towards the creative habits of in-
dividuals. On the other, Mandelbrot finds it sufficient to put
forward his discoveries as conjectures, arguing against a uni-
fied narrow conception of what is acceptable mathematics.
What we find in common among all cited here, however, is
insistence on the value and necessity of a multitude of intu-
itive approaches to mathematical creation.
3.4 Interactive Theorem Proving
We shall finally look at some contemporary trends in math-
ematics. A current issue that has been in the making for
much of the twentieth century but only recently has found
increased attention is the use of computer-aided proof envi-
ronments to develop and verify completely rigorous formal
proofs. With this, we loop back to Martin-Lo¨f’s theory of
types discussed in the very beginning.
Our source is the recently published Type Theory and For-
mal Proof (Geuvers and Nederpelt 2014). The book builds
up a formal system λD somewhat similar to Martin-Lo¨f type
theory, extending the Calculus of Constructions with con-
structs first introduced in the Automath system of N.G. de
Bruijn. After having built up the system to a substantial de-
gree, the real work begins, by formalizing a real mathemat-
ical theorem (Be´zout’s lemma) and its proof in the system,
illustrating that it is adequate for capturing serious mathe-
matical content. It may be noted that this shows the adequacy
for formalizing an existing and known proof.
Chapter 16, Further perspectives uses observations from
the proof of Be´zout’s lemma along with general consider-
ations to reflect on the system λD and type-theory-based
proof assistants more generally. We collect here some quotes
and discuss the implied context under which proof assistants
may be used. “The type theory λD provides a system in
which mathematical definitions, statements and proofs can
be completely spelled out in a very structured way that is still
close to ordinary mathematical practice. This enables and fa-
cilitates the formalization of mathematics and the checking
of its correctness. [. . . ] The high level of precision of type
theory greatly improves the level of correctness of the for-
malized mathematics: incomplete proofs, or proofs using il-
legal logical steps, are not accepted” (p. 379). The diagram
on page 381 is relevant, because it uses as inputs informal
proof p and informal statement A, thus assumes that both
have been formed at this point. If however we have not yet
fully formed p and A, the fact that the “precision of λD
guides the proof development” (p. 380) may come back to
bite us. It is no doubt a good thing that at some point a pre-
cise guide will point to flaws in the details of the develop-
ment, but doing so early may lead the user astray trying to
verify a nonsensical side-show statement that could easily be
falsified by a quick series of trial and error. The author has
made this experience first-hand working with the Coq proof
assistant.
Their chapter closes with a prognosis: “Proof assistants
have not yet developed into a standard tool for mathe-
maticians, but we strongly believe they will in the future”
(p. 387). In the world of mathematics, there is a culture delin-
eating the phases of discovery and rigorization that suggests
methods for the discovery process and may indeed enable
publications to spell out results for proof checkers in ways
similar to how results are elaborated into semi-formal proofs
today. We have seen that there is by no means agreement on
this, but at least mathematicians don’t generally assume they
have to start with the formal process.
In programming however, I am not aware of a general
agreement that problems have first to be solved in pen and
paper before their “formalization” as a program is to be
started. What is more, programming tasks frequently are em-
bedded in real-world interactions that require experiments
instead of just pen-and-paper simulations.
4. Learning by Analogy
We can summarize as follows: The 20th century has seen
increased interest in the foundations of mathematics and a
better understanding of the notion of proof. While rigorous
proof can be seen as emblematic of modern mathematics,
completely formal proof has been a polite fiction or idealiza-
tion in research mathematics. A vocal community of math-
ematicians insists on the continued importance of intuition
for the further development of mathematical content and ob-
jects to a prescriptive straitjacket that they fear would stand
in the way of creative discovery.
Just how does this affect the practice of computer pro-
gramming? Like mathematical argumentation, program con-
struction has undergone a series of rigorizations to prevent
the final product from going wrong. The parallel is so pro-
nounced that there is an exact formal correspondence be-
tween various formal logics and programming languages,
and there is an important sense in which program construc-
tion is equivalent to proof construction. More precisely, it is
equivalent to the construction of completely formal proof.
We have seen that in the mathematical community the
activity of formal derivation is not generally seen as ade-
quate for the creation of new mathematical content. This
begs the question: How do programmers working in rigor-
ous languages find programs?
Mathematicians, in my layman’s eyes, have highly id-
iosyncratic methods of discovery, and there is no reason for
programmers to be any more constrained. Indeed, when ex-
empt from corporate restrictions, programmers are free to
employ whichever methods they find helpful in discovery:
whiteboard sketches, pen and paper traces, contemplation
of denotational semantics, Node.js prototypes, etc. And no
doubt, in the era before time-sharing and personal comput-
ers, offline algorithm design was the norm, and one can still
find industry veterans today who claim to spend weeks de-
veloping programs without compiling. Today’s generation
of programmers however grew up on REPLs and the edit-
refresh-run loop of browser development. The expectation is
that the computer is an interactive device providing instan-
taneous feedback. The computer acts as a laboratory for the
discovery of programs.
It would certainly be easy to dismiss this approach as
dilettantism, the mark of the amateur, and it is certainly true
that experienced practitioners develop higher level reason-
ing for familiar problems. But it should be recalled that in
order to understand a problem, mathematicians employ “ex-
perimentation, judicious guessing, trial and error, the use
of analogies of the vaguest sort, blundering and fumbling”
(Kline) and run through special cases (Roberts) in their
blackboard or pen and paper labs. With a powerful com-
puting machine on their desks, why would programmers not
want to make use of it for exploring the problem space by
means of experiment?
Quickly observing the behavior of a few specific in-
stances can give a feeling for the active forces in a process.
Being able to push a value through my program and see the
resulting crash can be illuminating with an immediacy not
found in a lifeless compile-time error. For a quick sanity
check I can run a partial implementation early, even though
I have not announced all my assumptions (invariants) to the
compiler, because I know which precise input I will use. If
these activities are useful and we deprive the programmer
of such means of discovery, she will opt for a system in
which the balance between discovery and comprehensibility
is more to her (present) advantage.
4.1 A Bad Proposal: Prototype in Lisp, Implement in
Haskell
One might think that we already have all the ingredients:
Permissive dynamic languages and safe statically typed lan-
guages. So it is fine to fumble and blunder in Python or Lisp,
but the real work needs to happen in a disciplined language.
This does not seem to lead very far, however. The current
trend in software development is towards agile and away
from waterfall methods. Programs are not discovered in one
creative act to then be reconstructed cleanly and rigorously.
Software is often long-lived, undergoing constant evolution.
A possibly stable and rigorous core needs to be seamlessly
integrated with a more provisional, in-flux surface area.
It is often an additional requirement to be able to interact
with existing software libraries, such that a separate proto-
typing environment becomes unwieldy. When asked about
the motivation to replace the Structure and Interpretation
of Computer Programs course with a Python-based course
in the MIT undergraduate curriculum, Gerald Sussman re-
sponded that the type of engineering required to write soft-
ware had changed in the 1990s. Instead of the analysis and
synthesis view taught in SICP, what was now needed was
a more experimental, science-like approach in which “you
grab this piece of library, and you poke at it [. . . ] see what
it does” (Sussman 2016). Sussman readily admitted that the
previous curriculum was more coherent, but engineering had
changed, and it was necessary to find a new way to do and
teach it, even if they were still in search of the right ap-
proach. Not just first-in-class teaching curricula, but also
first-in-class programming systems need to adapt to the real
contextual usage requirements.
4.2 Gradual Rigor
If rigorous methods in practical software construction are to
succeed, they can not be hermetically sealed off from envi-
ronments that allow for creative discovery and preliminary
approximations. An ideal programming system would allow
for a wide spectrum of program construction, granting free-
dom for the act of discovery and means for the hygiene of
rigorization as an approach crystallizes.
As in mathematics, our goal should be enough rigor to
keep our programs healthy and strong, but enough flexibility
to enable us to fumble and blunder when still figuring things
out. And like in mathematics, we should be able to move flu-
ently, competently, and with confidence between both ends
of the spectrum.
Realism about the work of the practitioner In a 1979 pa-
per DeMillo, Lipton and Perlis (DeMillo et al. 1979) chal-
lenged the software verification community to move from
a standard of perfection to a standard of reliability, argu-
ing that even in mathematics “absolute rigor” had, in fact,
not been attained, and even less so in applied engineering
disciplines. They pointed to the supposed infeasibility of
full verification by social processes such as the judging of
proof by an expert audience. Type systems can be seen as a
partial response to this problem, where verification is done
automatically by machines instead of a human community.
The promise of dependent type systems is to far extend the
reach of possible correctness guarantees embedded in proof-
carrying code (Asperti et al. 2009).
This line of research seems to provide very apt responses
to the problem of verification described by DeMillo et al.,
by replacing the manual social verification step by machine
verification, based on a codification of the accepted intersub-
jective standard. But this does not absolve of the question
of how the design of languages with an eye towards easy
automatic verification affects the resulting languages and its
users as individuals for the purpose of initial creation. In this
context, it will not do to give some principled theoretical
account of possibility, but details of language ergonomics
will have to be considered. A notorious polemic declares
that untyped languages are unityped, and thus a mere spe-
cial case of statically typed languages (Harper 2011, elab-
orated in Harper 2012). This clarification is highly interest-
ing, but in no way accounts for the actual usage affordances
of static and dynamic languages, respectively. Harper makes
great points about the potential power of dynamicity safely
integrated into a statically disciplined language, while at the
same time giving nothing but condescending explanations
for the popularity of dynamic languages.
In mathematics, we saw a folklore belief (or pretense?)
that rigorous formal proof is at the center of the mathemati-
cian’s practice, but considerable evidence that this is not the
full story, and even found vocal individuals insisting on the
importance and legitimacy of non-formal methods. Maybe
the work of mathematicians is in principle equivalent to for-
mal proof, but in the reality of the details, it is not. Maybe
also, in the reality of the details, programmers find it easier
to discover solutions to their tasks in the degenerate unityped
languages they choose over languages with strong advanced
type systems.
4.3 The Landscape Today
In today’s mainstream programming language landscape,
programmers have few options other than making a choice
between languages with a simple and comprehensible math-
ematical foundation but with a tightly controlled execution
model that disallows or disincentivizes direct experimenta-
tion, and languages which will allow for fumbling and blun-
dering but do not offer a clear path towards a rigorous for-
mulation with strong static correctness guarantees.
On one end of the spectrum, Haskell and OCaml are pop-
ular statically typed functional languages. Their semantics
are relatively simple and amenable to mathematical reason-
ing, and they possess powerful static type systems that are
still growing in expressivity. These are the languages that
most seem to correspond to the vision of programming con-
jured up by Martin-Lo¨f.
On the other end of the spectrum, scripting languages
like Ruby, Python or JavaScript are conceptually less pre-
dictable and do not lend themselves to mathematical reason-
ing. The lack of compile-time type checking makes it easy to
experiment and write programs by incremental approxima-
tion, but also prevents compile-time guarantees about pro-
gram correctness, and disadvantages the language with re-
spect to tools support.
Languages like Java, C# or C++ provide static type sys-
tems that give them compile-time checks, superior tooling,
and often superior run-time performance. On the other hand,
they are not constructed around principles that allow for
straight-forward application of modes of mathematical rea-
soning. They possess type systems that still leave ample
room for fumbling and blundering, but provide little help in
eventually leaving that stage.
Especially in the web programming sphere, there have
been recent attempts to retrofit dynamic languages such as
PHP, JavaScript and Python with static type systems, which
often leads to idiosyncratic design choices. Dart and Type-
Script sacrifice soundness of the type system to use “opti-
mistic” type compatibility rules, in the interest of making
static types easier to use. Runtime errors are trapped by
the underlying dynamic language (Brandt 2011). Similarly
flawed type systems have appeared before, if with less pride,
for example in Java.
If we want to take the programs as proofs metaphor
seriously, not just as a theoretical construct, but as something
that can actually serve as a practical model for programming,
we need to think about ways of combining the best properties
of the various systems, or come up with altogether new ways
of supporting the modern development process.
4.4 A Speculative Evaluation Framework
For programming systems that support development all the
way from initial creation to eventual rigorous codification,
we expect supporting capabilities in two phases: discovery
and codification.
4.4.1 Discovery
The responses to Jaffe and Quinn hinted at the high diversity
of cognitive styles and approaches among mathematicians.
While ultimately mathematicians have a rigorous common
standard of communication, there is a lot of freedom for in-
dividuals to work with their preferred methods and amount
of guesswork. The degrees of freedom a technological sys-
tem can provide may always need to be augmented with ac-
tivities external to the system, yet programming languages
could optimize for the level of flexibility possible when al-
ready rigorously formulated parts of a software system inter-
act with experimental parts. We define three criteria that are
likely to be useful in exploring a problem space and discov-
ering possible solutions by enabling fumbling and blunder-
ing.
Special cases Testing a procedure by applying it to only
some special cases is irresponsible, but trying a basic idea
first on regular, then on edge cases is a time-tested heuristic
for developing the first draft of a general procedure. Con-
sidering special cases allows local and concrete reasoning in
place of contemplation of abstract generalities. A program-
ming environment can allow programmers to run and ob-
serve partial implementations on hand-selected inputs, even
if the implementation has obvious holes that have yet to be
addressed.
Flow trumps flaw An uninterrupted flow of ideas and as-
sociations is more important than the premature attention to
flawed details. I need not work out the details of an approach
I discard after five minutes of exploration.
Today’s incarnations of rigorous languages are not very
close to absolute rigor. In most programs, there are many
properties that are not captured by the type system (list
length, effects, co-effects), and I don’t have to battle the
type checker on those dimensions. Nevertheless, there is a
variety of cases where the type checker insists on guarantees
for certain properties. The more the type system conforms
to the ideal of preventing programs from going wrong, the
more details will have to be explicitly stated and treated.
While the details need to be taken care of as the overall
picture clears up, it is important to develop a high-level
understanding and see an idea through enough to evaluate
its overall value, before investing the time to care about all
the details.
Partial execution Especially when making changes to an
existing codebase, the programmer may want to test the
changes to one part of the program, while ignoring – con-
sciously or unconsciously – that global invariants have been
broken. The environment can allow the execution of partially
functional programs, even if there is no global coherence.
4.4.2 Codification
Discovery and experimentation are important, but so is hard-
ening and gradual refinement towards a shared and practi-
cally verifiable standard of correctness. Not only does this
provide better means for creating reliable artifacts, but it also
is the basis for a common language to communicate ideas
and judge implementations.
Crystallization As understanding of the programming task
and software system crystallizes, the programmer should
have a clear standard of correctness to work towards, and
should constantly be supported to make the assumptions and
invariants explicit and subject to verification.
5. Tools for Discovery
The goals and criteria described in the preceding section set
up desiderata but do not prescribe any particular solution.
A basic question that is left open, is whether we need to
think of this as strictly a programming language problem,
or whether it can be framed more broadly as a programming
system problem. The idol of mathematics presents a pattern
where the final form of rigorous proof is fixed (under ade-
quate idealization), but any path that produces this form is
considered legal.
In program construction, the tools for experimentation,
discovery and crystallization can either be built into the lan-
guage, or be available in a programming environment that
allows to eventually produce a program in a final rigorous
form, even if the language itself has no concept of impreci-
sion. Both approaches have been explored in prior work, and
it makes sense to discuss examples viewed through the lens
of this distinction.
5.1 As Programming Language Problem
A programming language that is to support the develop-
ment process from experimentation to refinement into a
well-understood, rigid form, needs to possess a powerful
type system that can capture the relevant behavioral prop-
erties, but also allows to encode and tolerate a level of in-
determinacy to support the phases where the programmer is
unwilling or yet unable to formally explain their intention in
detail.
Without reference to a particular implementation strategy,
this general idea of viewing the static-to-dynamic continuum
as a language-internal problem has already been called for in
(Meijer and Drayton 2004).
Gradual Typing Gradual typing is an attempt to combine
the benefits of static and dynamic type checking, yielding
control of which parts of the program are statically checked
to the programmer. At the core, gradual type systems ex-
tend static type systems with a special dynamic type that
is similar to a global supertype (Object in Java) that also
acts as a global subtype. To prevent the type hierarchy from
collapsing under the subtyping relation, however, a new non-
transitive consistency relation is introduced that allows any
type to be implicitly converted to and from dynamic. The
dynamic type can be associated with an expression either
explicitly or through omission of type information, in which
case the expression can act as any type at compile time, with
dynamic checks for each operation performed at run-time.
By supporting both approaches in the same language,
gradual typing enables programmers to evolve programs
from an implementation with only dynamically checked
types to a more predictable codebase with compile-time
correctness guarantees. As the program evolves, fragments
without static type checks can enter and be annotated repeat-
edly, or even remain part of the code base indefinitely.
The use of special cases is facilitated by the generous
type conversions possible in the system, but may require
manual effort on the side of the programmer. The ability
to use dynamically typed fragments is supportive of pro-
grammer flow. Partial execution is possible, but limited to
the dynamically typed fragments of a program. The presence
of a clearly defined and enforced type discipline provides a
framework for crystallization but relies on the programmer’s
discipline to make use of it.
The term gradual typing was introduced in (Siek and
Taha 2006). Recent research has been focused on improving
performance and communication of type errors (Garcia et al.
2016; Takikawa et al. 2015). Established languages that sup-
port some version of gradual typing are C#, or more recently
Dart and TypeScript.
Dependent Types The question of how much type infor-
mation to extract from the programmer becomes more rel-
evant as the expressiveness of type systems grows. In Why
Dependent Types Matter, Altenkirch et al. present a series
of refinements of merge-sort written in Epigram, a func-
tional language with dependent types. In their words: “It is
the programmer’s choice to what degree he wants to exploit
the expressiveness of such a powerful type discipline. While
the price for formally certified software may be high, it is
good to know that we can pay it in installments and that we
are free to decide how far we want to go” (Altenkirch et al.
2005). Because of the expressive type system it is possible
to encode not just structural information about function in-
put and output, but more complex required and guaranteed
properties for input and output – pre- and post-conditions.
As an example, a vector concatenation function may carry
the information that the length of the output vector is the
sum of the input vectors. If the compiler is unable to infer
this fact from the function definition, the programmer may
have a proof obligation on her hands! In this case, as an al-
ternative to providing a proof of this simple fact, Epigram
allows to use a more imprecise type that will merely express
that the output vector has some length.
The ability to choose the level of detail of typings grants
programmers the power to move more or less quickly and
revisit parts of the code deserving of greater precision over
time. This helps prevent disruptions of flow, and allows
for straight-forward crystallization. It is possible to observe
execution instances for selected special cases as long as
they are permitted under the current level of type precision.
Execution of any part of the program is only possible if the
whole program compiles.
5.2 As Programming System Problem
Statically-Aided Discovery Instead of manually running
experiments on code with lacking type information, pro-
grammers can provide type information and receive auto-
matic and direct feedback from the programming environ-
ment that may help revise and refine types and implementa-
tion.
(Dybjer et al. 2003) presents an extension to the proof
assistant Agda, that combines static and run-time analysis
by means of property-based testing to quickly identify dead-
ends in formal proofs with high probability. In this manner,
the system user can gain confidence in the validity of her
current attempt, before potentially wasting time and energy
trying to prove some ineffable, false property. This approach
supports crystallization by reducing the time to feedback.
Flow is somewhat disrupted by switching from implementa-
tion to verification, but examples for testing are even auto-
matically generated. Partial execution is limited to the frag-
ment under consideration.
A similar system is described in Dynamic Witnesses for
Static Type Errors (Seidel et al. 2016), which aims to com-
plement the abstract error messages provided by OCaml’s
type checker with problematic example inputs and an ac-
companying trace that illustrate the source of the error. Spe-
cial cases, that is example inputs and executions, are pro-
vided only for negative cases that produce a type error. Be-
cause the tool is external to the target language and com-
piler, execution of partially erroneous programs and testing
with arbitrary examples is otherwise not possible. Flow is
disrupted in just the same way as with a regular compiler,
but the duration of the disruption may be decreased. There
is no added support for gradual crystallization, even while
there is a clear and enforced standard of correctness.
There is a tradition of type-directed tools for interactive
proof construction in proof assistants like Agda, Coq and
Isabelle. A graphical user interface can present the avail-
able hypotheses and open proof obligations and allow to se-
lect standard routines (tactics) to automatically proceed with
parts of the proof construction (see also Asperti et al. 2009;
Geuvers and Nederpelt 2014). The same idea can be applied
to aided program construction as suggested in (Altenkirch
et al. 2005): The environment lists the current programming
goals based on the available type information and the pro-
grammer either implements them manually or by means of a
meta-programming rule available as library code.
Instead of supporting experimental discovery, the pro-
gramming environment provides support in reasoning at the
static level, gradually working towards a pre-defined and
checked type-level description of each part of the program.
The language Idris, designed for general purpose program-
ming, has a compiler with explicit support for this style of
interactive type-directed development (Brady 2016).
Pluggable Type Systems Type disciplines can be seen as
entirely external to the programming language, in which
case there may be not one, but many static type systems
designed for a language, allowing the programmer to pick
the most appropriate one or ones. Such optional, pluggable
type systems that have no effect on language semantics were
argued for in (Bracha 2004). Because pluggable type sys-
tems are essentially analysis tools for dynamic languages, all
discovery-phase benefits for flow, special cases and partial
execution transfer unimpinged. On the other hand, type sys-
tems become more of a tool for individual developers and
there is no longer any notion of crystallization towards a
common standard of rigor.
Flexible Execution Models for Typed Languages This
category of approaches is closest to gradual typing in that
a designated type system or standard of rigor is assumed and
combined with the desire to emulate the development expe-
rience of dynamic languages. Unlike in gradual typing, how-
ever, the type system is not enriched to allow the distinction
between static and dynamic fragments of a program. Instead,
the programming environment is altered to (optionally) de-
fer certain type checks to run-time, allowing the execution
even of provably type-incorrect programs. Execution may
fail with a trapped error if the execution path leads to an
error, or continue without failure as long as no problematic
part of the program is reached.
Always-Available Static and Dynamic Feedback (Bayne
et al. 2011) notes that “[most] statically-typed languages
embody the philosophy that an ill-typed program is of zero
value” and henceforth reject such programs. Instead, Bayne
et al. see such programs as valuable for experimentation
and want to provide feedback from both static analysis and
dynamic execution at any time.
Progress types (Politz et al. 2012), instead of giving the
programmer control over which parts of the program are dis-
ciplined by a static type system, grants control over which
type errors are to be compile-time errors, such that irrelevant
errors can be ignored until they occur at run-time. The au-
thors seem to see this approach as compatible with the idea
of pluggable types, however the presented system is focused
on the existing run-time type system of the base language.
Liberating the Programmer with Prorogued Program-
ming (Afshari et al. 2012) aims at creating a new program-
ming paradigm, based around a more interactive program
creation workflow. Their approach is based around three
principles: allowing the programmer to defer implementa-
tion partially to focus on an ongoing concern; allowing the
programmer to supply appropriate values during execution;
and allowing the programmer to execute partial implemen-
tations at any time.
In all three cases, disruptions to flow are minimal, special
cases can be hand-picked, and execution can happen at will.
With the possible exception of progress types, crystallization
towards a statically-checked type discipline is an explicit
goal and can be pursued gradually. An early version of the
basic idea is described in (Cartwright and Fagan 1991).
Recent versions of the Glasgow Haskell Compiler support
the deferral of type checks to run-time (Vytiniotis et al.
2015).
6. Conclusion
There is much work left to be done, both in working out the
details of even these speculative arguments, and if they con-
vince, in empirical investigation of their implications. When
reading the writings of researchers, one finds references to
the popularity of so-called dynamic languages, but this of-
ten appears as a curious, brute fact, something not available
to or worthy of analysis. Even publications presenting tech-
nologies in support of the dynamic habits of programmers
seem to confine themselves to appealing to only that brute
fact, putting the blame on programmers instead of justifying
the benefits independently. To give just one example: “The
ethos of gradual typing takes for granted that programmers
choose dynamic languages for creating software” (Takikawa
et al. 2015). My hope is to convince the reader that there
is something to learn from looking at programs as proofs,
and then looking at how proofs really come about, without
falling prey to idolizing mathematics.
Looking at the two examples drawn from architecture and
urban planning we can make a distinction that may help
address a possible objection. On one side, Wittgenstein’s
work raises doubts about whether his design was guided by
the ambition to provide housing3. On the other side, it seems
plausible (if not necessary) to believe that the architects of
modernist housing projects were in fact motivated by the
desire to provide housing. Unfortunately, this does not mean
that the results are altogether different in practice. Similarly,
my claim need not be that language designers are aiming
for a formalist paradise devoid of practical motivation. But
even if for the best intentions their design takes inspiration
from mathematics in a too simplistic manner, it may miss
important aspects and lead to similarly formalistic outcomes.
If we focus too much on making “programming an activ-
ity akin in rigour and beauty to that of proving mathematical
theorems”, while losing track of the “rather messy job of in-
structing this or that physically existing machine, by cunning
tricks, to perform computational tasks”, and not even paying
attention to how mathematicians really do prove mathemat-
ical theorems, we run the risk of erecting, like Wittgenstein,
a dwelling for the gods. The reality of the practitioner is not
as clean-cut and elegant as its idealization, but makes use of
a variety of mindsets, cognitive modes, and good old fudg-
ing. Coming up with an account of how the rigorous formal
systems we have conceived of can integrate with less rigid
components will be challenging, but worthwhile.
Acknowledgments
The seed of doubt was planted during my graduate studies
at the ILLC and further shaped by my work at Prezi. Andras
Slemmer’s interest prompted me to produce an elaborated
written version. Jan Martin Raasch, Ignas Vysˇniauskas and
Christoph Gietl helped by discussing the written version at
various stages. The reviewers caught some of my sloppier
thinking and suggested further material and distinctions.
References
M. Afshari, E.T. Barr, and Z. Su. Liberating the programmer
with prorogued programming. In Proceedings of the ACM
international symposium on New ideas, new paradigms, and
reflections on programming and software (Onward! 2012),
ACM, New York, USA, 2012.
T. Altenkirch, C. McBride, and J. McKinna. Why dependent types
matter. 2005. http://www.cs.nott.ac.uk/~psztxa/publ/
ydtm.pdf.
A. Asperti, H. Geuvers, and R. Natarajan. Social processes,
program verification and all that. In Mathematical Structures in
Computer Science, volume 19, number 5, October 2009.
M. Atiyah et al. Responses to: A. Jaffe and F. Quinn, “Theoretical
mathematics”: Toward a cultural synthesis of mathematics and
theoretical physics. In Bulletin of the American Mathematical
Society, volume 30, number 2, April 1994.
3 It brings to mind his metaphorical invocation of architecture: “I am not
interested in erecting a building but in having the foundations of possible
buildings transparently before me”.
M. Bayne, R. Cook, M.D. Ernst. Always-available static and
dynamic feedback. In Proceedings of the 33rd International
Conference on Software Engineering, ACM, 2011.
G. Bracha. Pluggable type systems. In OOPSLA Workshop on
Revival of Dynamic Languages, 2004.
E. Brady. Type-driven development with Idris. Manning, 2016.
E. Brandt. Why Dart types are optional and un-
sound. 2011. https://www.dartlang.org/articles/
design-decisions/why-dart-types.
R. Cartwright, and M. Fagan. Soft typing. In Proceedings of
the ACM SIGPLAN 1991 conference on Programming language
design and implementation, June 24–28, 1991, Toronto, Canada.
J. Davis, and R. Hersh. The mathematical experience. Birkha¨user,
Boston, 1981.
R.A. DeMillo, R.J. Lipton, and A.J. Perlis. Social processes and
proofs of theorems and programs. In Commun. ACM, volume
22, number 5, May 1979.
P. Dybjer et al. Combining Testing and Proving in Dependent
Type Theory. In D. Basin, B. Wolff editors, Theorem Proving in
Higher Order Logics: 16th International Conference, TPHOLs
2003, Rome, Italy, September 8-12, 2003. Proceedings. Springer,
Berlin, 2003.
J. Emerich. Applying types as abstract interpretation to a
language with dynamic dispatch. Master’s thesis. University
of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2015.
R.P. Feynman. New textbooks for the “new” mathematics. In
Engineering and science, volume 28, number 6, March 1965.
R. Garcia, A.M. Clark, and E. Tanter. Abstracting gradual typing.
In Proceedings of the 43rd Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL
2016). ACM, New York.
H. Geuvers, and R. Nederpelt. Type theory and formal proof.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
R. Harper. Dynamic Languages are Static Lan-
guages. Blog post. March 19, 2011. https:
//existentialtype.wordpress.com/2011/03/19/
dynamic-languages-are-static-languages/
R. Harper. Practical foundations for programming languages.
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
D. Hilbert. Axiomatisches Denken. In Mathematische Annalen,
volume 78, number 1, December 1917.
A. Jaffe, and F. Quinn. “Theoretical mathematics”: Toward a
cultural synthesis of mathematics and theoretical physics. In
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, volume 29,
number 1, July 1993.
M. Kline. Logic versus pedagogy. In The American Mathematical
Monthly, volume 77, number 3, March 1970. Mathematical
Association of America, 1970.
M. Kline. Why Johnny can’t add: The failure of the new math.
Vintage Books, 1974.
P. Martin-Lo¨f. Constructive mathematics and computer program-
ming. In C A.R. Hoare and J. C. Shepherdson editors, Proc. of
a discussion meeting of the Royal Society of London on Mathe-
matical logic and programming languages. Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 1985.
C. Mclarty. Poincare´: Mathematics & logic & intuition. In
Philosophia Mathematica, volume 5, number 2. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1997.
E. Meijer, and P. Drayton. Static typing where possible, dynamic
typing when needed. In OOPSLA Workshop on Revival of
Dynamic Languages, 2004.
C.J. Phillips. In accordance with a “more majestic order”: the
new math and the nature of mathematics at midcentury. In Isis,
volume 105, number 3, September 2014. University of Chicago
Press, 2014.
C.J. Phillips. The new math: a political history. University of
Chicago Press, 2015.
B. Pierce. Types and programming languages. MIT Press, 2002.
J.H. Poincare´. Intuition and logic in mathematics. In W.B. Ewald
editor, From Kant to Hilbert, volume 2. Oxford University Press,
2005.
J.G. Politz, H. Quay-de la Vallee, S. Krishnamurthi. Progressive
types. In Proceedings of the ACM international symposium on
new ideas, new paradigms, and reflections on programming and
software (Onward! 2012), ACM, New York, USA, 2012.
E.L. Seidel, R. Jhala, and W. Weimer. Dynamic witnesses for
static type errors. Electronically published on June 24, 2016:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.07557 (to appear in print).
M. Senechal. The continuing silence of Bourbaki: An interview
with Pierre Cartier. In M. Senechal editor, The mathematical
intelligencer, volume 20, number 1, 1998.
J. Siek, and W. Taha. Gradual typing for functional languages. In
TR-2006-06: Scheme and functional programming workshop,
University of Chicago, 2006.
G. Sussman. Video recording. Electronically published on January
11, 2016: https://vimeo.com/151465912#t=59m36s.
A. Takikawa et al. Towards practical gradual typing. In John Tang
Boyland editor, 29th European Conference on Object-Oriented
Programming (ECOOP 2015), volume 37. Schloss Dagstuhl,
2015.
D. Vytiniotis, S.P. Jones, and J.P. Magalha˜es. Equality proofs and
deferred type errors: a compiler pearl. In Proceedings of the
17th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Functional
programming (ICFP 12), ACM, New York, USA.
P. Wadler. Propositions as types. In Communications of the ACM,
volume 58, number 12, December 2015.
